



**Director of  
Central  
Intelligence**

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# **National Intelligence Daily**

*Thursday  
9 June 1983*

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**USSR: Andropov's Health**

*General Secretary Andropov probably is not as ill as current Western media reports suggest, and he presumably will be able to participate fully in the party and government meetings scheduled for next week.* [redacted]

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The reports stem from observations of Andropov at public functions for Finnish President Koivisto, who left Moscow yesterday. [redacted] the reports say that two aides supported Andropov as he entered the Kremlin banquet hall, that he needed assistance in sitting down and rising, and that his hand trembled "uncontrollably" while reaching for a paper. [redacted]

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One news article cites a Soviet official as saying Andropov has Parkinson's disease. The US Embassy reports a participant at the dinner for Koivisto privately added that Andropov's hands seemed to be a bluish color and that he appeared "almost blind." [redacted]

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**Comment:** Andropov's health is not good, but it probably has not changed. [redacted]

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Andropov probably will be able to participate in the few days of activity and appearances involved in the coming Central Committee plenum and the session of the Supreme Soviet. As in the past, he is unlikely to be on constant public display but will make several key appearances and perhaps give a speech of moderate length. Following the sessions, he probably will drop out of sight for a few days of rest. [redacted]

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**USSR: Discipline Campaign**

*Regional party and state officials are being purged in General Secretary Andropov's campaign against incompetent and corrupt personnel, but their superiors at the Central Committee level are either escaping blame or receiving only mild rebukes.* [redacted]

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A number of government officials in the Armenian Republic, including three republic ministers, were fired after a party plenum in late April. At a plenum in Georgia last month, the party leader—who also is a candidate member of the Politburo—named local party leaders who were guilty of embezzlement. He reminded his audience that serious embezzlement and bribery cases in that republic had been punished in the past by death. [redacted]

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The leader of the regional party committee in Moscow reported last week that a large number of party and industry officials had been purged. He said the police were culpable for concealing offenses and delaying investigations. [redacted]

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*Pravda* has noted that the party Control Committee had been forced to intervene against local party officials who tried to reinstate a party member purged for corruption. In that case, the head of one national ministry and the deputy head of another—both of whom are full members of the Central Committee—were blamed for the behavior of the purged offender but were let off with a rebuke. [redacted]

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**Comment:** The campaign is part of Andropov's program to stimulate the economy. [redacted]

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Central Committee members are not threatened directly with expulsion. Andropov may need their support to consolidate his power, or he may believe he is not strong enough to move against them now. This situation could change if Andropov strengthens his position at the plenum next week. [redacted]

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**JORDAN: Views on the Peace Process**

*The factionalism in the PLO has prompted Jordan to consider ways to encourage Arab leaders in the West Bank and Gaza to provide an alternative Palestinian voice in the peace process.* [redacted]

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The US Embassy reports that the Jordanians see prospects fading for working through the PLO because Arafat is preoccupied with the threat to his leadership and because Syria is gaining more influence over the PLO. Jordan is especially concerned that the Palestinian problem will become a secondary issue to the US as the Lebanon situation remains unresolved and Syrian machinations stall implementation of the withdrawal accord. [redacted]

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The Jordanians believe that the best alternative now lies with West Bank and Gazan leaders and that these leaders need the clear support of the US. They maintain that such support would encourage those in the occupied territories to assume an independent role in the peace process. [redacted]

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A senior Jordanian official says the US will need to protect the residents from Israeli intimidation before they can be convinced to step forward without PLO approval. They also will need assurances that the US endorses the transfer of real autonomy to the West Bank and Gazan Palestinians. [redacted]

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**Comment:** King Hussein appears increasingly concerned that the passage of time will have an adverse effect on the peace process. He wants the US to continue its efforts to seek a negotiated settlement by taking action that will encourage non-PLO Palestinians to become a catalyst for reinvigorating the process. [redacted]

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It will be difficult, if not impossible, to foster an independent West Bank and Gazan leadership. Jordan has only limited influence with West Bank residents, and Palestinian notables in the territories traditionally have been reluctant to act on their own. They probably will continue to hesitate, particularly if the more radical elements of the PLO gain the upper hand in the current conflict. [redacted]

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### **WARSAW PACT: Program To Improve Tanks**

*Warsaw Pact tanks now in service eventually will be equipped with advanced computers and sensors that will make their fire-control systems more effective.*

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**Comment:** NATO tanks can fire more accurately at longer ranges in darkness and in fog or smoke, and at higher speeds than the Soviet-made tanks. This advantage is based on the more extensive application of newer technology to NATO tanks.

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The technical advantages currently enjoyed by NATO tanks, however, are being eroded. The Warsaw Pact program to reequip its tanks complements the Soviets' effort to use more advanced equipment on their newer tank models. The sensor and computer systems will aid tank gunners by computing lead angles—which had to be estimated in the past—and by adjusting trajectories to allow for atmospheric conditions.

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**BRAZIL-LIBYA: Dispute Resolved**

Brasilia and Tripoli have agreed to terms for the return of four Libyan aircraft with their arms cargoes, which originally were destined for Nicaragua. The Brazilian Government announced yesterday that one of the planes has left Rio de Janeiro. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Press reports state the Libyan delegation that arrived in Brasilia last Friday may complete arrangements for the purchase of Brazilian trainer aircraft as part of the agreement to resolve the dispute. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** The terms of the compromise will prevent the Libyans' transporting the arms directly to Managua, but Libyan leader Qadhafi probably will make further efforts to aid the Sandinistas. Despite some tough talks on both sides during the 10-week-long controversy, Brasilia and Tripoli clearly wanted to preserve and strengthen their commercial ties. These include arms sales, cooperation in nuclear matters, and economic development projects. [REDACTED]

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**ISRAEL-LEBANON: Attack on Israeli Troops**

The attack yesterday near Beirut [REDACTED] will raise Tel Aviv's concerns about Palestinian infiltration into Lebanon. Defense Minister Arens told the US Ambassador on Monday that Israel plans to retaliate if attacks on Israeli forces continue. Arens claims the attacks have been inspired by Syria. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** Although a Lebanese group has claimed responsibility for the latest attack, the Israelis almost certainly will hold the PLO and Syria responsible. If Israel decides to retaliate, it is likely to launch commando raids or airstrikes on Palestinian positions. In addition, the Israelis probably will intensify their demands that the US and Lebanon take preventive steps. [REDACTED]

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
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**USSR: Large Military Exercise Announced**

A Soviet exercise involving some 50,000 troops will be held from 29 June through 4 July in the Baltic and Belorussian Military Districts and the eastern Baltic Sea. The Soviets yesterday gave the 21-day advance notification required by the Helsinki Accords, stating that no observers would be invited and only Soviet troops would participate.

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**Comment:** The lack of invitations suggests the exercise, which has not yet been named, will be devoted primarily to field testing new combat formations or operational concepts.

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25X1**PAKISTAN-USSR: Foreign Ministers' Meeting**

Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan begins talks today in Moscow with Foreign Minister Gromyko that are expected to focus on the UN-sponsored negotiations on Afghanistan, which resume next week in Geneva. This is the first high-level exchange since General Secretary Andropov's meeting with President Zia at Brezhnev's funeral last November. Since then, Soviet media attacks on Pakistan have softened. In addition, Moscow has agreed to consider new economic aid and increased trade, and there have been no serious incidents on the Afghan-Pakistani border.

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**Comment:** The Soviets probably believe that Yaqub's recent consultations with Pakistan's allies have strengthened Islamabad's resolve to stand firm in Geneva. They will be seeking to weaken that resolve and to probe for differences in the Pakistani Government over the Afghanistan issue. The Soviets are still trying to appear flexible in order to prevent the Geneva talks from breaking down.

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**UK: Election Day**

Prime Minister Thatcher's Conservative Party seems set to score a resounding victory today, with some polls showing it winning as many as 400 seats in the 650-seat House of Commons. These polls give the Labor Party 200 seats, the Social Democratic-Liberal Alliance about 20 seats, and other small parties—including those in Northern Ireland—another 20 or 22 seats. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** The major worry remaining for Tory leaders is the possibility that, with Labor out of the running, the Alliance could attract last-minute support from moderate Tory voters trying to reduce Thatcher's landslide. As many as 15 percent of Tory voters might switch to the Alliance for this reason. Conservative leaders have been stressing the risks involved in such vote switching, noting that the Labor Party could be the ultimate beneficiary. In any event, there almost certainly will not be enough defections to deprive Thatcher of her victory. [REDACTED]

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**BULGARIA: Zhivkov To Expand Economic Reforms**

Party leader Zhivkov told the leadership last week that he will introduce more economic reforms in 1984. He said declining quality of industrial exports means the country has to import advanced technology, particularly machinery from the West. He also said that prices of industrial goods should reflect quality standards and that wages should take into account the quality of the goods produced as well as volume of production. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** Zhivkov's new stress on economic reforms comes at a time when most East European leaders are waiting for the Soviets to chart the path they will take on the issue. By urging industry to accelerate economic reforms, Zhivkov probably hopes to repeat the success he had in applying incentives to agriculture in 1979. Next week Zhivkov will visit Hungary, where he is likely to confer with party leader Kadar on Hungary's experience with economic reforms. [REDACTED]

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**PERSIAN GULF: Status of the Oilspill**

Oil continues to leak from the damaged offshore Nowruz wells at a rate variously estimated by oil industry experts at between 4,000 and 12,000 barrels per day. No massive body of oil has been observed, although Saudi and Qatari officials report small tarballs on beaches and slicks in offshore waters. Some of this oil is from ships illegally dumping wastes. Recent efforts by the Persian Gulf states to bring Iran and Iraq to an agreement on well capping have been futile, but discussions continue. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** The elusiveness of the oilspill, the largest in Persian Gulf history, may be explained by several factors. The spill is highly fragmented and dispersed, but much of the oil may be concentrated in Iranian waters and therefore not be observable by reporting sources. Oilspill analysts from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration visiting the wells last week believe some of the oil may be attaching to particles deposited on the Gulf by sand and dust storms, forming tarballs, and sinking to the bottom. [REDACTED]

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


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## Soviet Military and Economic Commitments to Non-Communist LDCs, 1973-82

Billion Current US \$



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### 1982 Commitments

Million Current US \$

	Military	Economic
<b>Total</b>	<b>9,120</b>	<b>882</b>
<b>Middle East/North Africa</b>	<b>5,706</b>	<b>NEGL</b>
Iran	11	
Iraq	3,003	
Kuwait	258	
Libya	386	
Syria	2,012	
Other	36	NEGL
<b>Latin America</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>173</b>
Nicaragua	35	163
Peru	106	
Other		10
<b>South Asia</b>	<b>3,136</b>	<b>75</b>
Afghanistan	169	75
India	2,959	
Other	8	
<b>Sub-Saharan Africa</b>	<b>137</b>	<b>634</b>
Angola	100	400
Ethiopia	10	170
Mozambique	NA	5
Other	27	59

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## **Special Analysis**

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### **USSR: Aid to the Third World in 1982**

*Soviet military sales and economic aid commitments to non-Communist Third World countries rebounded strongly in 1982 from the low ebb of the year before, but they still remained below the high levels of 1979 and 1980. The USSR's aid program is vital to the preservation of its influence and strategic interests abroad. The mounting instability arising from the poor economic and financial conditions in most developing countries is creating new opportunities for penetration. Moscow, however, has to pay more to maintain its current position among its Third World clients.*

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Moscow changed the terms of sale for its arms in 1982 to make them more attractive in light of the worsening economic climate and increased competition from Western suppliers. It offered concessionary terms, rescheduled debts, and made some of its best armaments available. Iraq and Syria, for example, were able to buy new-model T-72 tanks and high-performance aircraft on easy terms.

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The Soviets also licensed the sale of some of its more advanced military production technology to a non-Communist country—India

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### **Military Sales and Deliveries**

Soviet arms sales contracts reached \$9 billion in 1982, 50 percent higher than the year before, and well above the average for the last five years. Decisions to equip Iraq's and Syria's armed forces accounted for most of the increase. These two countries, plus India, accounted for nearly 90 percent of new orders.

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Deliveries of military equipment also increased substantially last year, spurred by record backlogs and the strenuous efforts to resupply Iraq and Syria. Almost 50 percent of the military tonnage shipped out of the Black Sea in 1982 went to those two recipients, with deliveries to Iraq tripling over 1981. Except for jet fighters, nearly all categories of Soviet weapons delivered showed sizable increases, especially surface-to-air missile launchers and artillery.

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Although Angola, Mozambique, and Nicaragua account for only a small part of total deliveries, they received larger shipments in 1982. Record shipments to Angola included the country's first guided-missile patrol boats and T-62 medium tanks. Two more squadrons of MIG-21 fighters also were delivered. [redacted]

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Moscow sent Mozambique new armored personnel carriers, tanks, and tracked bridging equipment. Soviet deliveries to Nicaragua increased in value from \$6 million in 1981 to \$53 million in 1982. They included additional T-55 tanks, the country's first BM-21 mobile rocket launchers, and mobile radio direction-finding stations to locate guerrilla communications sites. [redacted]

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### **Economic Aid**

The USSR's commitments of almost \$900 million worth of economic aid were up 70 percent from 1981, dominated by large new pledges to three favored clients:

- Angola signed a \$400 million contract for a dam and power plant that probably are to be financed with 10-year credits.
- Ethiopia received \$170 million in credits and grants to finance oil purchases from the USSR.
- Nicaragua received commitments for \$163 million worth of development projects, technical assistance, and emergency commodity assistance. [redacted]

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Disbursements of economic aid reached \$1.2 billion last year, a 40-percent increase over the record level reached in 1981. Commodity support to Afghanistan and Ethiopia and large deliveries to Nigeria and Pakistan for steelmaking projects were responsible for most of the increase in disbursements. About 40,000 Soviet economic technicians were employed in developing countries in 1982, with nearly one-half working on projects in the Middle East and North Africa. [redacted]

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### **Outlook**

In view of the priority Moscow attaches to its military aid program and the record amount of undelivered military orders, approximating some \$22 billion, Soviet arms deliveries are likely to remain at or near current levels for the next few years. Moreover, future deliveries will contain a wider array of newer and more advanced weapons to a growing list of customers. The availability of advanced weapons and an apparent increased willingness to offer concessionary terms will help discourage recent efforts by some of Moscow's largest buyers to diversify the sources of their military supplies. [redacted]

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The USSR's willingness to sell arms on concessionary terms, however, is also likely to reduce its hard currency earnings somewhat. Returns from military sales nevertheless will continue to contribute an important part of total hard currency earnings. [REDACTED]

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Moscow's commitments for economic assistance probably will stay near the billion-dollar level this year. New pledges, however, are likely to be more restricted to the current group of Soviet-oriented regimes. [REDACTED]

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